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One of the most important branches of our legal ju-
risprudence is that department known as, "The L aw of
Corporations," which-is everywhere and every day more
and more demanding the attention of thinkin6 people,
because of' !hn active part it new takes in nearly all
business enterprises of the present century.
It may t,-uly be said that in early colonial times,
there were no business corporations of any description.
The clot,ing worn was either imported from foreign coun-
t-ies, or' consisted of home-spun garments,which were al-
most universally made by hand,thus doing away with the
necessity Ur manufactories,while railroad,tolegraph and
telephone companies had not yet come into existence.
But,as the laws of theination conrenced to extend over a
lariger expanse of territory,the condition of the people
and of the countr\ itself be 'an to change,as a result of
which,the laws of the nation and of the separate states
have been continually developing,new ones being added and
old ones amended or stricken out,as best served the pur-
poses of the times. With the growth of the comnercial
interests,came a cry for the revision and extens on of
the laws of commiierce. 1.1oreover,as business increased
and new inventions were -iscovered,capitalist s soon became
anxious to invest their money in profitable business en-
terprises,but unless they could to a certain extent be
protected by the law,they refused to so use t1leir capital.
But the old saying that"where there is a will then is a
way" soon became apparent in this case,for the law of corpo-
rations very soon became established,ani to-day occupies
one of the most important branche; of our jurisprudence.
In speaking of this department of the law, I shall not
endeavor to treat of the whole subject at large as it is
toovast to permit of my doing so; many volunes having
already been written upon it,althouh the law itself has
been in force but a short period of time. I have there-
fore chosen as a fit subject for discussion the relat ins
of the directors to the stock-holders,with a view to point-
ing out ,hat rights,if any,the minority stoch-holders have
or ought to have against the directors or other stock-hold-
ers for wrongs conTnitted by them. Whc the directors are
and the nature of their office,are the questions to which
we must necessarily devote our present attention.
The directors may be said to be themselves o ,nmers of
stock ,of the corporation. They are chosen by the other
stock-holders to conduct the affairs of the organization.
And are ,in one sense of the word,the Supreme mana'ing
officer, thereof. Unless a provision cf the statute,
or the charter or by-laws of the corporation places some
restriction upon them,their po,,rer inay be Faid to be one
of almost unlimited jurisdiction. When spoken of 'vrith
reference to t-~e rel2ticns which exist between them and
the other stockholders ,they are -niversally mentione.l as
trustees. They are not however in a strict sense true
trustees either with the corporation or the stockholders
themselves as their true "cestuis que trust" since neither
the legal title to the corpor :tion prorerty nor to the
stock is vested in them.
In ex parte Chippoendale,4 DeG.M. ', GI, Turner J.
speaking of the relations between the directors and the
company said:
"Although directors undoubtedly stand in the
position of agents and cannot bind their company
beyond the limits of their authority,they also stand
in mme degree in the position of trustees. There
is no inconsistency in this double view of the Position
of directors. They are agents and cannot bind
their company beyond their powers. They are trustees
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and are entitled to be indemnified for expenses in-
curred by them within the limits or' their trust. They
a
are bound to obse-ve the limits placed upon their
powers in the charter. And ,if they transcend such
limits and cause damage,they incur liability. If they
act fraudulently,or do a willful wronj,it is not
doubted that they muy be held for all the damage they
cause. But,if they act in good faith within the
limits of their powers,using proper prudence and
diligence,they are not responsible for mere mistakes
or errors of judgment."
The board of directors of a corporation do not stand in
the same relation to the corporate body which a private
agent holds toward his principal. In the first place,
in the strict relation of' principal an agent ,all the
authority v'ich the latter is empowered to exercise is
deriyed either from an express or implied delegation from
the former. Secondly, in corporate bodies the powers
of the directors are in a very important sense original and
undelegated. Neither do the stockholders confer,nor can
they revoke these powers. They are derivative only in
the sense of being received from the state ,being embodied in
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the articles of incorporation. When convene! as a board,
the directors are the primary posessors of all the powers
which the charter confers. Chief Justice Hin-man says:
"Indeed joint stock cumpanies in modern times
are nothing but commercial partnerships,which have
taken the form of corporations for the greater facility
of transacting business,and to prevent a dissolution
of the concern by those numerous events which are so
liable to wo-k a dissolution of a partnership composed
of a greater number of individuals."
They must hiave applied to them principleR making them
accountable like all trastees,or the ;rievance would be
intolerable ,since otherwise a majority of the stockholders
acting through the directors,who would thus cease to be in
fact what the law considers them--the agents of the whole
body of stockholders--and ould become the private agents
of the reajoritymight set the minority at defiance and
manage the affairs for th~ir own supposed benefit and the
benefit of the majority Yho appointed them. "Pratt vs. Pratt
Co.,33 Corn 453."
But,whatever,the relations between the parties may be,
and whether the directors and managers of corporations can
in a strict sense be called trustees or notthere can be
no doubt but that their character is a fiduciary one,they
-6-
being entrusted by others \fith powers which are to oe
exercised for the conmmon and gener; 2 interests of the corpo-
ration and not for their own Iivate benefit.
Such directors or rmanaers are in fact both trustees and
agents of the bodies represented by them. They fall there-
fore within the rule which juards and restrains the dealings
and transactions between trustee and cestui que trust,and
agent and his principal. And also within the great prin-
c&ple by ,rhich equity requires that confidence shall not
be abused by the party in whom it is -eposed. This rule
equity this r- c y t'ies to enforce by imposing a
.iisability either partial or complete upon the party inter-
ested,to deal on his o',n behalf in respect to any matter
involved in such confidence. Hence -t is impossi)le for
us to limit the duties of a director or manager of a corpo-
ration in this respect to some particular event: as focr
instance while they are acting as directors or managers
under any special delegation of power or are in attendance of
meetings of' the board. Such a limit to the general scope
ef the rule ,-ould deprive it of almost all its value and
usefulness,and would open an easy avenue of escape,thus
facilitating innumerable evasions of its force. Justice
Johnson in the case of Hoyle vs. Plattsburg R.R. Co.,
-7-
54 11I.1.,314 said:
"The fact that the powers of a director to act
for or to represent the corporation may be so limited
in respect to its being bound by his acts,does not
f irnish any ground for sayin," that his fiduciary
capacity and consequent dutied are subsequent to the
same li-,it. On the contrary,thesemust be held to
KcKx±xk( continue so long as his directorship
continues. Mo reovermany of our large and most
useful enterprises of the present day as well as a
variety of the diffbrent branches of business require
for their existence and successful prosecution a
large and permanent investment of capital. These
are usually and most conveniently established and
managed by meana of corporate organization. The
affairs of these corporations are,with but fe',, excep-
tions intrusted to the exclusive management and control
of the board of directors. Hence from thevery nature
of their position,there is an inherent obligation
im, lied in the acceptance of such trust,not only that
they will use their best efforts to promote the inter-
est of the share-holders ,but that they will in no
manner use their positions to advance their c-rn indi-
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vidual interests as distinguished from that of the
corporation. Also,that they will not acquire any
interests in the corporation that will conflict ,wlith
the fair and proper discharge of their duties."
Stor, 's Equity Jurisprudence,Sec. 455 4, provides:
"That trustees and persons standinj in similar fidu-
ciary capacity,shall not be permitted to exercise
their powers,and manage or appropriate the property
of which they have control for their own profit or
emolument V
Or,as it is sometimes expressed,sh:ll not take advantage
of their situation to obtain any personal benefit to them-
selves at the expense of their cestui que trust. The ulti-
mate object for which every ordinary business corporation
is formed,is the pecuniary profit which it is expected to
realize to each of its in-lividual members. These profits,
usualln called dividends,must of necessity be paid out of
the fund which remains exclusive of the capital stc-k,after
the expenses of the business have been paid. The doctrine
upon this subject appears to me to be very fairly and
correctly stated by Chancellor Walworth in his opinion
rendered in the case of Scott vs. Eagle Insurance Co pany,
7 Paige,2O3,whe-e he says:
-I11-
"As the directors are bound to exercise a proper
discretion in making dividends of surplus profits,if
they abuse that power of' dividing the unearned pre-
miuris,witho.it leaving a sufficicmt fund exclusive of
the capital stock to satisfy the p'obable losses,they rm:y
in case of any extraordinary loss,which is sufficient
to exhaust the whole capital and more,make themselves
personally liable to the creditors of the company. On
The other hand,should they without reasonable cause
refuse to divide what is actually surplus profits,the
stockholders are not without a remedy if they apply
to the proper tribunal before the corporation has
become insolvent. But to d-etermine what the actual
is
profits of the corporation are often a matter of
practical difficulty. Much of the confusion which
arise- ds owing to the fact tha a proper distinction
is not made between the capital stock and the profits."
The term ' capital st(ck" in the provision of the
revised statutes,page 60I,S c. 2,prohioiting the directors
of a company from making" any dividends except from the
surplus profits of a corporation,or from :ividing,withdraw-
ing or in any ,ray paying to the stockholders any part of
the capital stock of such corporation,means the property of
-Is-
the corporation contributed by the stock-holders,or other-
wise obtained to the extent required by its charter.
Vice Chancellor Sanford in the case of' Barry v.
Merchant's Exchange Company,makes e clea- and precise dis-
/
tinction between these terms,renderin6 extremely simple
that which at first seemed to be difficult. He says the
capital stock of a corporation is like that of a co-partner-
ship or joint stck company,the amount which the partners or
associates put in as their share in the concern. To this
they add upon the credit of the company,from the means and
resources of others,to such extent as their own prudence
or the confidence of such other persons will permit. Such
additions create a debt; they do not form capital. If
successful in their career,the surplus over and above their
capital becomes profits,and is either divided among the
partners and associates or use., still further to extent
their operations.
I Sanfo-d's Chancery,307.
From what has already been said it will readily be
inferred that the power of distributing the surplus profits
of the business among the stockholders lies almost entirely
within the discretion of the directors. Upon them rests
the duty of saying whether dividends shall. ,r shall rint
be declared; when they shall be so declared; as well as the
amount that is to be divided. Except in those cases where
their authority is restricted either by statute or the
articles of incorporation,their power according to the
present law is without liriitation and free from restraint.
They are at liberty to exercise a very liberal discretion
as to the manner in which the profits of the business of
the corporation shall be disposed of. So long as they
qct in the exercise of ai honest judgment,their power over
thu disposal is absolute. They may reserve of them what-
ever their jutjrment approves as necessary or judicious for
repairs and improve:lents to the buildings or machinery,or
to meet continJencies,both present and r'vspective which
they think may possibly arise.
Their determination in respect to these matters,
if made in good faith and for honest ends,thouji the result
may show that it was injudicious,is final,and not subject
to judicial censure. But,as the cirectors themselves
usually hold the majority of the stock,it very often happens
that they refuse to declare dividends when they can lawf.lly
do so. Their object in so doiD5 seems to be to compel
those whIe are not 'rithin the -ing or combination,to sell
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their stock; or,as it is usually expressed,they freeze out
these poor unfortunates by hcldir; back that which ri3ht-
fully belongs to them. After this freezinj process or mild
form of coercion has proved successful,an_ wen the ,9irectors
or their friends have .jotten control of the stock,corpora-
tions which first proved a failure,soon spring into pros-
perous e-terprises°
To accomplish their purpose an.! at the same tive
escale the clutches of the law,they are very careful to
have thei" actions appear for the interest of the company
and not for any individual member. Besides the saheme of
reserving the srplus to make improvements,,,hich are ener-
ally purely ima.:inary ones,the directors sometimes buy
property for 'hich they -ay an exhorbitant price,their main
object bein!; to "id themselves of the su-(olus profits.
Another meth¢0 -resorted to is to either increase t. e salary
of the present officers of the corporation or to establish
ne>r ones ,iith large salaries attached. In the caseof
Zpigier v. Hoagland,5 N.Y. Sur. 305, the plaintiff owned
less than half the stock in a corporation and the defendant
owned the residue. For many years plaintiff was one of
the three trustees constituting the board,but the defendants,
who were all of one family,were also elected tlustees,and
and they elocted themselves respectively,President,Secre-
tary and treasurer. One oig the .Iefendants s( u ht to buy
plaintiff's steck,but he refuise, to sell,whereupon said
cleferrdat threatened to raise the ;alaries of the officers,
which was Jone. In the next year,another refusal tG sell
was followed by another r ise of salaries. So hat,instead
of $I800.00 each per year--the salaries which had been paid
for mny years--the oi'ficers were to receive respectively;
fifty thousand, hirty thousand and six thousand :ollars and
a further increase was threatened,with the statement that
the power of the trustees to increase the salaries ;ras
unlimited.
Another company was controlled by the corporation,and the
same officers were chosen an-. they voted themselves salaries
respectively of; S:,ven Thousand Five Hundred,Six Thousand
and One Thousand Dollars,though pr-eviously the oificers of
the company had se-ve2i without payi The business of both
concerns , ias very profitable. The salaries voted were
shown to be g-reater than the s:.rvices were worth. The
court held that the action of the trustees was fraudulent
and that qquity would restrain the psyment of more than the
real value of the officers' services. While the clear
intention of the defendants --ras to enforce tie laintiff
to retire from the corporatiom,the court merely decided
that in the p-esent case,they had adopte! an illegal method
to accomplish their purpose,without passing upon the
question whether the directors mist divide the surplus
earnings or not. Thus,no restrictions havin" been placed
upon them,they could still refuse to declare dividends by
using the profits to mke so-called inprovements,or by
paying exhorbitant prices for land,at the same time accom-
plishin5 their object,althou;h in a slightly different manner.
This case will serve to give us but a fair illustration
of the manner in which the stockholders who are in a minority
are forced net only tc relinquish not only their claims to
the surplusbut are also compelle3, to sell their stock and
beti-e from the corporation. It is a fundamental prin-
ciple of business that unless stock investments are paying
dividends,the market value of the stock itself depreciates
and soon becomes practically unsalable. Thus the -directors
by refusing to Jlivide the profits,not only accomplish thoi '
pu--pose Of freezinj out those who:cannot afford to stay in
the corpovation,but they also give tc the outsi:ie worl,' the
impression that the corporation is a non-paying onethereby
enabling them to buy these stockholders' shares at.a discount
from the real value.
With such a state of affairs occu ing almost daily,
it is indeed strange that some law has not yet been passed
which .vould not only act as a check upon the powers of the
directors but would also tend to increase those of the
minority stockholders. That the present, law is defective
is ,I tiiink,apparent to every fair minded person. But how
to remedy the wrong,and at the same time do justice to the
largest merdW,is the difficult problem which we have to
solve. For unless we move with great caution and pre-
cision,we are liable to create a new evil equally as unjust
as the one which we are trying to remedy. Therefore,if we
were to substitute for the present law,a provision that
the directors must declare dividends when the minority
ask for a division,provided there be a surplus,it would very
often happen that no pvovision would be made for future
contingencies,as a result of which the corporation would be
likJ, to go into insolvency. That it is eften a wise
policy,as well as shrewd business management to reserve
the surplus for actual expected contingencies or for the
purpose of making needed improvements is not denied. But
as soon as they employ these metho,-s not with the intention
of benefitting the corporation itself,but simply to act as
a shield for themselves while they deprive others of their
lawful property,then it is that these stockholders have a
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just -ight to complain. The difficiity with the present
law is hat the powers of directors ol. managers (-f corpo-
rations are too extensive; while those of the stockholders
and especially those who are in a minority are not extensiv:
enough.
No doabt the originators of the law thouit this
Jifficulty would be averted by placing the directors sub-
ject to the same rules as an ordinary trustee would be when
holding a similar position. Indeed,many cases can be fcLund
containing dicta to the effect that thc minority of the
stcckholders in a corporation have a remedy in chancery
against the directors,whethor individuals or corporations,
assisting or confederating with them to prevent such
corporations and the directors thereof from making an#
misapplication of their capital o- profits,which might
result in cdiminishin6 the Dividends of stockholders or the
value of their shares,if the acts intended to be -one create
what in law is termed a breach of trust or duty. These
cases almost universally contain clauses to the effect that
the directors will be held responsible for any misappli-
cation of the surplus,but they do not provide that the
dividends must be declared though there is an actual profit
realized from the business. On the contrary,,they ]bave
this entirely within the discretion of the directors
themselveswho as we have alreaiy seen,very often use their
power to further some nefarious schemes of their own.
If a provision morlifying that part -f the present law
which relates to the powers and priveleges of officers of
corporations should be rmde,whereby some more efficiont
theck could be placed upon the directors,thus rest-icting
their powers,much of the difficulty which we now encounter
would henceforth be done away with.
In attempting to solve what the nature of these
amendrments shall be,we are at once confrente: with numerous
obstacles and difficulties,which require from us our most
earnest and careful attention. After due consideration
of this subject with a view to considering these difficulties
as much as possible,I have ventured to suggest the followving
plan which wouli at least modify som of the evils now
encountered,if,indeed,it did not abolish them. The
plan is as follows:
First, The directors of all business co -porations
shall be appointed by the stockholders in the sane manner
as now provided for b" law.
Second, These directors shall be the managers of the
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corporation, upon whom will rest the responsibility of seeing
that the business is carried on in a proper manner, and for
the interest of the stockholders at large rather than for any
one individual ,embor.
Third, The relations between these directors and the
other stockholders shall be considered to be the same as
those which exist between a trustee and a cestui que trust,
any failure to faithfully perform their.duties to be considerd
as a breach of trust, and punished in like manner.
Fourth, Before any improvements can be made either to
the buildings or machinery, or investments made in real estate
or other property the consent of two-thirds of all the stock-
holders must be first obtained.
Fifth, The salary of no officer of the corporation
shall be increased nor no new office shall be created without
first obtaining the consent of two-thirds of the stock-holders
Sixth, Before any loan of money shall bo made either to
the corporation or by the corporation, the consent of two-
thirds of all the stock-holders must be first obtained.
Seventh, At the end of every year a meeting of all the
stock-holders shall be called to consider the advisability
of dividing the surplus, instead of leaving the question of
disposal entirely within the discretion of the directors as
provided for by the present law.
Eighth, Whenever two-thirds of all the stock-holders
determine that a division of the surplus profits should be
made, as well as the amount that should be distributed, it s
shall be the duty of the directors to declare such a dividend.
Ninth, If however the directors refuse to declare the
dividend, when they can legally do so, it shall be the duty
of the Judge of any Court of Record in this State, to appoint
a referee to investigate into the affairs of the corporation
whenever appealed too for assistance by a stockioholder of the
corporat ion.
Tenth, Upon the referees finding that a dividend can
legally be declared it shall be his duty to command the
directors to declare such a dividend.
Eleventh, Should any stock-holder refuse to accept his
propor!-ion of the surplus profits the amount of his share
shall be placed to his credit on the books of the corporation
and shall be considered as money advancedto the corporation
by said stock-holder, to secure payment of which, a bondomr
other evidence of debtsshall be issued by the corporation
to the stock-holder which shall bear the legal rate of interest
Twelvth, At all meetings held to consider the advisabilutv
either of making improvements or investments, of increasing
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the salaries of the officers,of loaning or borrowing money
or establishing new offices,or for declaring new dividends
as provided for by sections four,five,six,seven,eight,nine,
and tenit shall be the duty of the treasurer of the corpora-
tion to nake and file a correct report concerning the finan-
cial condition of said corporation.
Thirteenth, Should the treasurer through fraud or negli-
gencemake and file a report which is not an accurate state-
ment of the financial condition of the corporation he shall
be held criminally liable for said offense.
Mr.Eugene D. Hawkins in his prize essay upon this subject
when speaking of the legislation that is needed for the pro-
tection of minority stockholders expresses himself in the
following manner:
"More adequate and summary protection from ultra vires
acts would be afforded minority stockholders if the charters
of corporations designated more specifically the powers con-
ferred both upon the majority and the directors. If the right
of visitation were extended so as to compel corporations to
exibit their affairs to state boards of commissioners and to
apply to them as well as to a majority of stockholders before
exercising any unusual authority conferred by the charter the
minority stockholder would be safer than if alone,he were
obliged to fight his battle against the majority."
His suggestions concerning the charters of corporations is
an excellent oneand a-ly legislation tending to carry out his
intention in this respect would be a step in the right direc4m
tion.
Rut,as to the advisability of extending the right of
visitation to State Boards of "ommissioners, I beg to disa-
gree with the learned gentleman for the following reasons;
Experience has already taught us that the work done and
good accomplished by these boards of conmissioners virtually
amounts to nothing.They make their annual tour of inspection,
hastily glance at the books of the concern, then depart to
another part of the state to visit some other corporation the
nature and object of whose bus-iness is entirely different from
that of the one they last visited. Having completed their
journey,they proceed to head quartersmake out their reports,
and then do their only real work,viz; draw their salaries,
a matter of importance which they never fail to perform.
Moreoverscarcely any two corporations keep their bcoks
exactly alikefor business men have their peculiarities,their
own ideas as to book-keeping.
It would thus be a matter of 'Very little difficulty for
the officers of the corporation to so keep their books as to
make it almost impossible to detect any evidence of fraud
except by the most careful and painstaking work of annexpert.
That the commissioners would not have time to do their
duty in such an instance,and that the officers would thus ac-
complish their wrongful purpose with comparative ease,is,I
think,clear to every one.
Instead of having this State Commission would it not be
preferableecuo have a committee of the stockholders appointed
by their associateswhose duty would consist of examining the
books of the concern,and reporting the results of their inves-
tigation to their fellow members? nertainly they would be
more liable to understand the manner in which the books were
kept,and would be interested to such an extent that they
would make every effort on their part to discover any signs
or indications of fraud.
11hile the suggestions I have made are probably defective
in many particularsyet should they or similar ones ever be
adopted into our corporate laws,many of the difficulties which
the corporate stockholders now encounter would be swept away.
Forby taking from the directors the power of having the
entire control of the finances of the concern,and at the
same time giving this privelege to the stockholders themselves
the chances for freezing out any member is made more diffi-
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cult if not,indeed,quite impossible.
Firthermore,by increasing the power of the Courtsso that
they can interfere in all cases where they are appealed to
for assistance b the stockholders,a check would thus be
placed upon the directorsand many cases of unjust oppression
which we now encounter would be done away with.
If we stop to consider how large a part of the business
now done throughout the country is accomplished by means of
corporations, the necessity of having this department of law
as just and reasonable as possible will be at once apparent
to all.
As the very key-stone to the existence of our National
Government is the principle of distributing justice equally
among all its citizensit necessarily follows that our State
laws must also be founded upon the same principle.
Frank E. Thomas.
